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This paper examines Colombia’s experience with an inflation-targeting monetary 
policy following the abandonment of exchange rate bands in 1999, and two 
episodes in 2003 and 2004 that deviated from this general behavior. In these 
episodes, the Central Bank intervened in the forex market on a relatively large 
scale in order to affect the trend of the exchange rate (managed floating).  These 
episodes are examined to draw lessons and highlight the main challenges facing 
monetary and forex policy. The rationale for central bank intervention in the forex 
market in Colombia is then critically discussed. Finally, the paper presents several 
issues that appear in the debate on Colombian monetary and forex policy and 






                                                 
* The opinions expressed in this document do not reflect the views of either the Banco de la República or its Board 
of Directors. I would like to thank Jorge Toro, José D. Uribe and Carlos Varela for their comments. 
  3  41.  Introduction 
 
Monetary policy in Colombia converged to a pure, full-fledged inflation-targeting strategy after 
the abandonment of exchange rate bands in 1999. Between 1999 and 2004 the exchange rate 
regime could be characterized most of the time as independent floating (Bofinger and 
Wollmerhäuser, 2003), that is, a floating regime with sporadic and relatively small interventions 
by the Central Bank in the forex market aimed at restoring the level of international reserves or 
curtailing excessive volatility. Unlike other central banks, the Central Bank of Colombia 
followed a rules-based forex market intervention and avoided discretionary intervention until 
September 2004. 
Two episodes marked a deviation from this general behavior. The first occurred in 2003, 
after the sharp depreciation of the Colombian (henceforth Col) peso, which followed the increase 
in sovereign spreads due to political uncertainty in Brazil. The second has taken place since 
2004, with the fast appreciation of the currency. In these episodes, the Central Bank intervened 
in the forex market on a relatively large scale in order to affect the trend of the exchange rate 
(managed floating).  
The next section presents a brief account of the Colombian experience with inflation 
targeting and forex intervention. The paper then describes the two episodes mentioned above in 
some detail to draw lessons and highlight the main challenges facing monetary and forex policy. 
The rationale for central bank intervention in the forex market in Colombia is then critically 
discussed. Finally, the paper presents several issues that appear in the debate on Colombian 
monetary and forex policy and provides an idea of the political context in which monetary policy 
decisions are made. 
 





In 1991 and 1992 the Constitution and the Central Bank Law granted goal and instrument 
independence to the Central Bank, and established that its main objective was to preserve the 
purchasing power of the currency. Colombia had experienced moderate inflation (15-30 percent 
annual rates) for about 20 years and a crawling-peg regime with capital controls had been in 
place since 1967. The new constitutional mandate led to a process of gradual disinflation starting 
  5in 1991 and to some exchange rate flexibility, in the context of a monetary policy strategy based 
on the use of intermediate monetary targets. Most capital controls were removed between 1991 
and 1993, and explicit crawling exchange rate bands were adopted in 1994. In the presence of 
large fiscal and external imbalances, the terms of trade shocks and the “sudden stop” of 1998-99 
forced the abandonment of the exchange rate bands in September 1999, in the midst of a 4.2 
percent decline in gross domestic product (GDP) and a financial crisis involving state-owned and 
mortgage banks. Thus, a floating regime was established and monetary policy converged to a 
full-fledged inflation-targeting framework. The initial conditions of this transition can be 
summarized as follows: 
•  The Col peso had depreciated by 22.0 percent in real terms between January 
1998 and December 1999 within the band system (the bands were shifted in 
September 1998 and June 1999). This explains, among other reasons, the 
smooth transition from bands to floating (Banco de la República 1999). 
•   During the defense of the exchange rate bands (1998-99), international 
reserves declined by 18 percent, reaching a level deemed too low in 
September 1999.
1 
•   The economy entered the deepest and one of the longest recessions since the 
1930s. The fall in income, the financial crisis and the high level of indebtedness 
of firms and households caused a weakening of the credit channel of monetary 
policy. 
•   Inflation fell from 16.7 percent in December 1998 to 9.23 percent in December 
1999, the largest decline since the beginning of the disinflation. However, it 
was still above the long-term inflation target (by then the international level). 
•   Several elements of inflation targeting were already present in Colombia by 
September 1999. Explicit inflation targets were introduced by the Central Bank 
Law in 1992 and had been announced since 1991. Forecast models had been 
implemented since 1995 and an Inflation Report had been published since 
December 1998. 
 
                                                 
1 During that period the Central Bank sold US$2,672 million in international reserves. 
  6In this context, monetary and foreign exchange policy had two main initial objectives. 
The first was to continue gradual disinflation toward its long-term target, which was later 
announced to be a range between 2 and 4 percent. The second was to restore international 
reserves to levels that would limit the external vulnerability of the economy. The gradual 
approach to disinflation (as opposed to an alternative opportunistic approach) considered the 
state of the economy and the need to bring output close to its potential level. Hence, a strategy of 
flexible inflation targeting was in fact adopted (Svensson, 2000). 
The inflation-targeting strategy identified the Central Bank’s short-term repo interest rate 
as the main instrument of monetary policy. The floating exchange rate regime added to the 
consistency and transparency of the monetary policy framework, and marked a sharp departure 
from the past. The policy had one main objective (inflation) and there were no explicit or 
implicit targets on the exchange rate. Consequently, intervention in the forex market was initially 
limited to two purposes. First, it was to build up the level of international reserves. Second, it 
aimed to prevent excessive volatility of the exchange rate. It was believed that allowing 
excessive volatility in the forex market could foster the generation or propagation of speculative 
bubbles, and that there were no market instruments to hedge extreme movements in the exchange 
rate. 
To accumulate international reserves, a mechanism of auctions of (put) options to sell 
dollars to the Central Bank was adopted. These options could only be exercised if the exchange 
rate was below (more appreciated than) its 20-day moving average. The main criteria behind this 
type of intervention were that it was not aimed at changing the trend of the exchange rate, and 
that it would be used only when an appreciation trend was observed. To curtail excessive 
volatility, an automatic auction of put (call) options was established. The idea was that if the 
exchange rate deviated in one day by more than 5 percent (later 4 percent) from its 20-day 
moving average, the Central Bank would hold an auction of options for a publicly known 
amount. 
A key feature of these mechanisms is that they are pre-announced and the results of 
intervention are published with no delay. This was perceived to have three advantages. First, 
rules-based, transparent intervention avoids legal risks for the Central Bank. Second, it is easily 
verifiable by the market and the public, so the coherence of the intervention with inflation 
targeting is checked and there are no adverse effects on inflation expectations. Third, the power 
  7to limit excessive volatility is increased (when there are no fundamental forces behind the 
increased variability).
2   
In December 2001, a call-options auction facility was introduced to support monetary 
policy in the event of a sharp depreciation. The conditions of this facility were symmetrical to 
those of the put-options mechanism used to accumulate international reserves. This instrument 
would prove to be very useful in the first serious challenge faced by the inflation targeting, rules-
based forex intervention scheme after the sovereign spreads rose due to political uncertainty in 
Brazil. In 2004, the Central Bank stepped up its foreign exchange intervention in the face of a 
rapid appreciation of the Col peso. Since the objective was to counter the exchange rate trend 
and the existing intervention mechanisms were judged ineffective, discretionary intervention was 




In 2000-04 Colombia was an example of inflation targeting at work. Given the initial situation 
summarized in the previous section, the Central Bank reduced its nominal interest rates by 550 
basis points (Figure 1) between 2000 and 2004, allowing 3-month CD rates (the benchmark 
interest rate) to keep real values well below the historical average for the whole period (Figure 
2). This was consistent with the reduction in the output gap and increased growth rates (due also 
to global economic acceleration), as shown in Figures 3 and 4, while inflation continued 
declining and was on target in 2004 (Figure 5). Inflation expectations also fell, and the credibility 
of the inflation targets increased (Figures 6 and 7). 
An interesting feature of this period has been the length of the recession (output has been 
below the estimated potential level since 1998).
3  A possible explanation has to do with the fact 
that the financial fragility of firms, households and some intermediaries, as well as the state of 
the economy after 1999, may have increased the risk perception of the financial sector and 
diminished the appetite for new credit. At the same time, the government issued increasing 
amounts of domestic bonds. These factors reduced credit supply and demand, and weakened one 
of the most important channels of transmission of monetary policy. Thus, the stimulus of low 
interest rates was not very powerful at the beginning of the period.  
                                                 
2 This is the same reason why credible exchange bands are successful in limiting volatility. 
  8A second explanation is related to the fact that disinflation policy has not been fully 
credible. Hence, the Central Bank has not been able to be overly expansionary because the 
existence of an output gap continues to be necessary to drive inflation down to the long-run 
target. The lags in inflation expectations with respect to the targets and the difference between 
real wage increases and estimates of labor productivity lend some support to this hypothesis 
(Table 1). 
  Regarding foreign exchange policy, international reserves reached comfortable levels, as 
reflected in several indicators of external liquidity (Table 2). The degree of exchange rate 
floating was not lower than in other floating regimes in the region, as measured by some ratios 
typically used for this purpose (Tables 3 and 4).
4  
Considering these results, it might be argued that the overall performance of inflation 
targeting and the intervention scheme has been successful. One of the reasons for this success is 
that there has not been a conflict so far between monetary policy decisions and foreign exchange 
interventions. Periods of accumulation of reserves correspond to periods of stable or decreasing 
short-term interest rates, and sales of international reserves have occurred with stable or 
increasing interest rates (Figure 8). The strategy faced two serious challenges in 2003 and 2004, 
related to large external shocks. The next sections provide descriptions of those episodes and 
feature the response of the Central Bank in each case. 
 
Episode 1: June 2002 to March 2003 
 
Uncertainty about Brazil’s economic and political outlook produced a fast increase in Latin 
American sovereign spreads (Figure 9). The Colombian spread rose even more than that of other 
countries except Brazil. This shock induced a strong pressure on the Col peso, which depreciated 
by 30 percent between April 2002 and February 2003 (Figure 10). The crisis in Venezuela at the 
end of 2002 forced a reduction in the payments of Colombian exports by that country and a fall 
in Colombian nontraditional exports (Figure 11). This added to the pressure on the peso. 
The macroeconomic situation at the moment of the shock was characterized by the 
following: 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
3 According to some measures of the output gap, the period 1982-III–1987-I was the longest previous episode in 
which output was below potential. 
4  See, for example, Calvo and Reinhart (2002) and Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002). 
  9•   A trend of appreciation since October 2001 (Figure 10). 
•   A negative output gap (current lower than potential). Nevertheless, the gap 
was closing after the widening that followed the adverse effect of the U.S. 
slowdown on the Colombian economy (Figure 3). 
•   Inflation had been on target for the past two years and has been converging 
toward the target since August 2002 (Figure 5). Inflation expectations have 
also been declining (Figure 14). 
 
After the shock, imported goods prices increased rapidly (Figure 12). Tradable goods 
inflation started to increase (Figure 13), as well as total consumer price index (CPI) inflation 
(Figure 5). Although the pass-through was low and had fallen since the 1990s, the extent of the 
depreciation put at risk the accomplishment of the inflation targets. Other supply shocks (food 
prices) reinforced this trend.  
Authorities at the Central Bank considered these shocks to be transitory, although the 
authorities were uncertain about the duration of the external shock. The most worrisome piece of 
information came from the rapid escalation of inflation expectations (Figures 6 and 14). Given 
the importance of expectations in price and wage setting at the beginning of the year, this was 
viewed as a major threat to the achievement of declining inflation not only for 2002, but 
especially for the future. 
The Central Bank’s response to these shocks can be summarized as follows: 
 
•   Initially, the Central Bank stopped the period of reduction in interest rates that 
had started in the first quarter of 2001. 
•   The fast rate of depreciation in the second half of 2002 activated the automatic 
volatility auctions of call options. Between July and October 2002, sales 
reached US$414 million through this mechanism. The depreciation of the Col 
peso continued even after spreads came down in November 2002. 
•   The rise in inflation expectations and the persistence of a highly depreciated 
exchange rate induced the authorities to increase interest rates by 100 basis 
points in December 2002. In January 2003, that was a move that may be 
judged aggressive, given the pace of interest rate changes in previous years. 
  10•   The exchange rate did not show any sign of a correction, so in February of 
2003 the Central Bank used the call options mechanism to support monetary 
policy for the first time and announced its willingness to sell up to US$1 
billion through July. 
•   In April the Central Bank raised interest rates by another 100 basis points in 
order to curb inflation expectations. 
•  Finally, the currency started to appreciate in October 2003. This appreciation 
was slower than in the rest of the region due probably to the fall in exports to 
Venezuela. Sales reached only US$345 million between February and July, 
out of the maximum US$1 billion announced. In December 2003 annual 
inflation (6.5 percent) finished close to the upper end of the target range (6 
percent). 
 
The authorities deemed the policy response to the shocks of 2002 successful overall. The 
main lessons drawn from this episode were the following: 
 
•   Central Bank intervention in the forex market was a useful complement to 
interest rate policy. It was perceived that the increases in the interest rates 
alone were not sufficient to correct the depreciation of the Col peso or to curb 
inflation expectations. In other words, the exclusive use of interest rates would 
have required much larger movements than those observed, probably 
introducing inefficient output volatility. 
•   The intervention announcement was useful because it was credible. It was 
believed that the signal effect of the announcement was strong. Its credibility 
stemmed from three factors: (i) it came with consistent, strong monetary 
policy measures (an increase in interest rates by 200 basis points); (ii) it came 
after a sizable depreciation had already taken place. (iii) it was not incredibly 
large, given the initial level of international reserves (US$11.1 billion or 1.1 
times short-term debt payments).  
•   Sales of international reserves through the volatility mechanism were 
perceived as inefficient. By design, they are relatively small interventions 
aimed at limiting exchange rate volatility. However, volatility in the second 
  11half of 2002 was not a sporadic event, but reflected the speed of a 
fundamentals-driven depreciation. Under discretion, the Central Bank would 
not have intervened. But the existing rules and the rate of the depreciation 
automatically triggered the intervention. Therefore, those sales show that the 
rules-based intervention had a cost. 
   
Episode 2: 2004-05 
 
The appreciation of the Col peso in 2003 was lower than the depreciation in other countries in 
the region owing to the weakness of exports to Venezuela. This situation reversed in 2004, when 
the recovery of those exports, the increase in exports to other destinations, improvement in the 
terms of trade, the rise of foreign direct investment (in the oil and coal sectors) and the presence 
of low spreads and external interest rates caused a rapid appreciation and the peso caught up with 
other currencies (Figure 15). 
The initial macroeconomic situation was characterized by the presence of a negative 
output gap (current output below potential; Figure 3), an inflation rate declining toward the target 
(Figure 5) and a continued reduction of inflation expectations (Figure 6). In this context, the 
appreciation produced two outcomes. First, it reduced imported and tradable goods inflation 
(Figures 12 and 13). Second, it caused repeated complaints from exporting sectors and from the 
government, which regarded a competitive real exchange rate as a key element in its security 
strategy. 
For the Central Bank, the appreciation was, to a large extent, a delayed correction of the 
depreciation that occurred in 2002-03. With the appreciation, the Central Bank’s inflation 
forecasts decreased and the probability that inflation could end up below target in 2004 
increased. Therefore, in February 2004 interest rates were reduced by 25 basis points. At the 
same time, accumulation of reserves resumed through the put-options mechanism. Stocks had 
fallen after the interventions of 2002-03, and there was also an agreement to sell reserves to the 
government in order to reduce public foreign indebtedness. 
Real appreciation continued, reaching 4.3 percent in annual terms in February 2004. At 
that point it was not clear whether the appreciation was already excessive, especially given the 
balance of payments outlook, which showed that some of the factors driving exchange rate 
behavior were transitory. In particular, a future decline in oil export volume and a decrease in 
  12terms of trade were expected. So, recalling its successful intervention of February 2003, the 
Central Bank announced its willingness to buy up to US$700 million between April and July by 
means of the put-option mechanism. 
Unlike the 2003 episode, this time the Central Bank bought the amount announced, while 
the exchange rate kept appreciating. Despite the appreciation, the inflation forecast did not fall 
far below the targets for 2004 and 2005 to grant a further reduction of interest rates at that point. 
Tradable goods inflation was falling slowly with respect to the appreciation (Figure 13) and 
nontradable goods inflation was rising (Figure 16), suggesting that the output gap could be 
closing fast. Thus, foreign exchange intervention was sterilized by sales of public debt securities 
held by the Central Bank and by lowering the Central Bank’s credit to financial intermediaries 
(repos).  
In September appreciation accelerated and larger short-term capital inflows were 
observed (Table 5). It was believed that the put-options mechanism was not a very effective way 
to deal with a clear, strong appreciating trend.
5 Therefore, the Central Bank introduced 
discretionary intervention and announced its willingness to buy up to US$1 billion in three 
months through this mechanism. Initially, discretionary intervention was effective, but as the 
market learned and estimated the amount of effective intervention, the exchange rate appreciated 
even more, exhausting the “intervention budget” announced by the Central Bank. 
In December the analysis showed that the inflation target for 2004 was going to be met. 
Inflation expectations kept falling, each time closer to the 2005 target, and nontradable goods 
inflation had stabilized and was starting to fall, indicating that the output gap was not closing too 
fast. Hence, the inflation forecast suggested that a looser stance of monetary policy was 
consistent with the achievement of the inflation target in 2005 and with a declining inflation path 
from 2006 onward. 
Based on this analysis, the Central Bank reduced its interest rates by 25 basis points, 
announced further discretionary forex intervention with no fixed amount or horizon, and closed 
indefinitely its contraction repo facilities to reduce the interest rate arbitrage opportunities for 
commercial banks. Since then, the exchange rate has stabilized (Figure 10), but Central Bank 
intervention has been substantial (close to US$800 million in the first quarter of 2005). The 
                                                 
5 If option holders have expectations of a sharper appreciation in the future, they will wait to exercise their options, 
thereby limiting the power of intervention to moderate the appreciation. 
  13monetary expansion ensuing from the intervention has been partially sterilized by government 
deposits in the Central Bank and by cuts in credit to financial intermediaries. 
Total reserve purchases in 2004 were around US$2.9 billion, of which US$1.323 billion 
was bought between September and December through discretionary intervention. Net 
international reserves increased by 24 percent, one of the highest growth rates in the world, and 
still the currency appreciated by 8.7 percent on average in nominal terms (Figure 17). 
Throughout this process there has not been a pre-announced target level for the exchange rate. 
The main lessons and challenges that can be drawn from this episode are the following: 
 
•   There has been no contradiction between monetary and exchange rate 
policies. Purchases of international reserves have been made in the context of 
decreasing inflation forecasts and an expansionary monetary policy. For this 
reason, inflation expectations have not been adversely affected by the 
intervention in the forex market and the Central Bank has not imposed capital 
controls. The latter, if effective, would be useful only if the Central Bank 
tightened monetary policy and tried to avoid appreciation at the same time. 
•    The effectiveness of discretionary intervention varied along the episode. 
Initially, a maximum amount was announced for a definite time horizon. The 
rationale for the announcement was to make clear to the market that no 
monetary excesses would be accepted. This was consistent with the fact that 
interest rates were held constant at first. It might be argued that effectiveness 
was low in this period because monetary policy was credible. Later, monetary 
policy was relaxed and no amounts or time limits were announced for 
discretionary intervention. Then the exchange rate stabilized. This could be 
related to the larger uncertainty about fundamentals
6 or to the low levels 
reached by the exchange rate. It is also consistent with the shift to a looser 
monetary policy stance. Toro and Julio (2005) provide some evidence on this 
contrast. 
                                                 
6 In 2005 terms of trade have kept rising and export growth to neighboring oil-exporting countries is increasing. 
However, U.S. growth is expected to decline and there is considerable uncertainty regarding the speed of adjustment 
of monetary policy in the United States and the behavior of the dollar. 
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the signal effect of intervention is larger when the latter comes with monetary 
policy actions in the same direction. 
•   From these last two points, it may be concluded that intervention is more 
effective when supported by consistent monetary policy actions, and that the 
issues of discretionary vs. rules-based intervention or announced vs. non-
announced intervention are less important. That is, the signal and portfolio 
balance effects of intervention are weaker than the traditional monetary policy 
effect. However, as illustrated by the 2002-03 episode, interest rate 
movements alone do not do the job efficiently. That is, the monetary policy 
effect is stronger when it comes with signal or portfolio balance effects. 
•   The current stance of unlimited, discretionary intervention faces several 
problems and challenges. The first one is that, if intervention is too large, the 
Central Bank may become a net debtor of the financial system. A net creditor 
position is regarded as more desirable for reasons of monetary control.  
•   A second challenge has to do with the fact that communicating policy has 
become more difficult. Before, the main policy signals were the shifts in 
short-term interest rates. Today it is more difficult for the public to verify and 
for the Central Bank to communicate the monetary policy stance. This is 
because the Central Bank is not only moving the interest rate, but also 
intervening in the forex market with substantial amounts, closing/opening 
repo facilities and selling government securities in the secondary market. Of 
course, this issue is less serious when all these instruments are changed 
consistently and policy is adequately communicated. 
•   A third problem is related to the quasi-fiscal costs of intervention. If monetary 
expansion is sterilized (even partially), the Central Bank will incur a cost as 
long as domestic assets have higher rates of return than foreign assets. This 
problem is more serious the more precarious the overall fiscal situation or the 
larger the extent of sterilized intervention. 
•   Evidently the scheme in place will be in trouble if there is a conflict between 
the inflation targets and the desired behavior of the exchange rate. In this 
  15situation capital controls could be an option, but this has not been discussed so 
far.
7 The Central Bank has warned the public about this risk and has stated 
that, in such a case, intervention would have to be limited or eliminated, for 
inflation is the main target of the Central Bank’s policy. 
 
3.  The Rationale for Intervention 
 
To better understand the policy responses described in the foregoing sections, it is useful to 
examine the rationale for forex intervention in Colombia. Hence, this section reviews some 
hypotheses and discusses their merits.  
Some explanations of “fear of floating” (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002) do not seem to apply 
to Colombia. For example, although lack of credibility in future monetary policy may be an issue 
in the future, especially if structural fiscal problems remain unsolved, the record shows 
decreasing inflation and expectations of inflation. The fact that the Colombian government is 
able to place fixed-rate, long-term, peso-denominated bonds in increasing amounts casts some 
doubt on such a hypothesis. 
Foreign currency-denominated public debt makes up approximately 25 percent of GDP. 
Most of it is unhedged. So public liability dollarization would be a good candidate hypothesis. 
However, since 2002 the government has insisted on a depreciated real exchange rate as a 
necessary condition for higher growth and employment. However, private external debt has 
decreased since 1999 and hedging instruments are being used more widely. Nontradable sectors 
have decreased their currency mismatch, and financial system currency positions are matched by 
regulation. Besides, in the discussions about the policy response to the depreciation of 2002, 
liability dollarization is not a significant issue. 
As in many countries, pass-through in Colombia has declined with the reduction of 
inflation and the adoption of inflation targeting (Figure 18). Pass-through is low enough to 
ascertain that it is not the key consideration in the policy response. In this regard, it is useful to 
note that after a nominal depreciation of about 30 percent in 2002, core CPI inflation rose by no 
more than 2.5 basis points from its lowest level in October of 2002 to its peak in 2003. In that 
episode the main source of concern was the size of the depreciation itself, rather than the size of 
the pass-through. The policy response (floating and targeting total CPI inflation instead of 
                                                 
7 Deposit requirements on external loans are still in place in Colombia, but the required rate is zero. 
  16nontradable inflation) conformed to the optimal response in an economy with a low pass-
through, according to Devereux, Lane and Xu (2004).    
Furthermore, none of the previous hypotheses explains the large reserves purchases that 
occurred in 2004-05, when the currency was appreciating. Thus, there must be other reasons for 
intervention. They may be divided into two groups, which are discussed below. 
 
Rationale for Intervention as a Complement of Monetary Policy to Achieve  
the Inflation Targets and Smooth Output Fluctuations  
 
One rationale for intervention corresponds to the reasons for using managed floating as an 
efficient monetary policy strategy (see, for example, Bofinger and Wollmerhäuser, 2003). The 
idea is that the relationship between the interest rate and the exchange rate (usually a version of 
the uncovered interest parity—UIP—condition) is not predictable and that central banks do not 
have a clear understanding of the variance or persistence of the shocks hitting such a 
relationship. In these circumstances, the use of the interest rate as the only monetary policy 
instrument may result in inefficiently large variances of inflation and output.  
By contrast, when portfolio balance effects are relevant, the Central Bank may use the 
exchange rate as a second instrument to reach its ultimate goals through sterilized intervention. It 
may do so without incurring quasi-fiscal costs, by restricting the feasible combinations of interest 
rates and exchange rates so that the Central Bank’s profits are not changed. With two instruments 
at hand, inflation and output volatility are reduced after a transitory UIP shock. 
    This hypothesis nicely reflects one of the lessons drawn from the 2002-03 episode: 
Interest rate movements alone were not deemed sufficient to curb depreciation and inflation 
expectations, and foreign exchange intervention turned out to be a valuable complement. The 
relationship between the Central Bank’s interest rates and the exchange rate in Colombia is not 
well understood. It depends on the transmission from Central Bank rates to other interest rates 
(deposit, lending, public debt securities, etc.), and on the arbitrage possibilities in those markets. 
The same hypothesis is useful for explaining intervention in 2004-05. Furthermore, in the 
case of a shock that leads to a depreciation of the currency, intervention is limited by the size of 
the international reserves stock.  Hence, in periods of appreciation the Central Bank may choose 
to build up that stock in order to enhance the possibility and credibility of future intervention in 
  17the event of a depreciating shock. This type of argument has been used in the discussions of 
monetary and exchange rate policy in Colombia. 
However, some problems remain with this approach. The first one is related to the 
difficulty of communicating policy, as mentioned above and as stated by Svensson (2004). The 
second one has to do with the quasi-fiscal cost of sterilized intervention. Bofinger and 
Wollmerhäuser (2003) show that sterilized intervention is not costly if the peso valuation of the 
newly acquired reserves is included in the calculation of central bank profits. Nevertheless, the 
Central Bank’s accounting procedures do not include peso-valuation effects of international 
reserves in the computation of profits. Thus, the result of those effects is not transferred to the 
government, and sterilized intervention ends up being costly from the government’s point of 
view. As argued below, this may interfere in the relation between the Central Bank and the 
government. 
 
Rationale for Intervention as an Instrument to Achieve Other Objectives  
in the Framework of Flexible Inflation Targeting 
 
Sometimes the achievement of inflation targets is consistent with the pursuit of other objectives 
by the Central Bank. For example, international reserve accumulation was desirable after the 
1998-99 crisis, and it has taken place since 2000, while inflation has declined. In this sense, the 
discussion of intervention in Colombia has considered three arguments in favor of accumulation 
of reserves, provided that the attainment of the inflation targets is not compromised. 
First, it is argued that given the relatively high levels of public and external indebtedness 
and the volatility of international capital markets, it is advisable to hold a rather large stock of 
international reserves. And, of course, a period of appreciation is the best time to build up 
reserves. This discussion pertains to the issue of the optimal level of reserves and is a matter of 
frequent analysis in Colombia. At some point, holding too large a stock of reserves might prove 
inefficient because of its opportunity cost and the incentives it might provide for excessive, badly 
invested external capital flows (a third-generation crisis type of argument). 
Second, owing to continued government deficits, the exposure of financial intermediaries 
to the sovereign has risen rapidly in recent years. For example, domestic government bonds 
represented 20.4 percent of the total assets of depository institutions in March 2005, and 31.8 
percent of the assets of pension funds in December 2004. This trend has been reinforced by the 
  18government’s policy of reducing its foreign exchange exposure by relying more on the domestic 
capital market for financing. It is argued that this situation poses a risk for financial stability 
because a depreciation of public bonds may produce serious losses for the financial 
intermediaries and, eventually, a run on banks toward the dollar. Hence the need to hold a large 
stock of reserves. 
A difficulty with this argument is that larger holdings of reserves could induce larger 
holdings of government paper in the portfolios of financial intermediaries since the ex-ante 
perceived risk of a run is lower. That is, higher levels of reserves could exacerbate moral hazard 
on the part of the government and the intermediaries. The root of the problem is that risk-based 
capital requirements on public bonds are probably undervalued. Thus, the best solution would be 
to set adequate capital requirements on public bond holdings by financial institutions. This would 
diminish financial fragility, limit the incentives to hold government bonds, correctly price market 
(and default) risk and reduce the need for international reserves.  
Third, it is claimed that exporting firms incur sunk costs in accessing international 
markets. Hence, a temporary, sharp appreciation that forces those firms out of the market is 
undesirable. Empirical evidence supports this “hysteresis” argument for Colombia (Roberts and 
Tybout, 1999). The Central Bank has expressed concern about the effect of appreciation on 
tradable sectors and has sometimes justified intervention on these grounds. A possible drawback 
of this rationale is that the public may perceive that this is a major goal for the Central Bank that 
may eventually conflict with the inflation targets if, for example, there is a shock that 
permanently appreciates the currency in real terms.  
 
4. Political Economy Issues 
 
Political economy issues pervade the discussion and the decisions of monetary and exchange rate 
policies. In the case of Colombia under inflation targeting and a floating regime, four major 
political economy issues can be identified. 
 
The Government and the Real Exchange Rate 
 
The government regards the real exchange rate as a key element of its security strategy, arguing 
that employment loss due to real appreciation strengthens the position of illegal, armed groups, 
especially in the countryside. In addition, some government officials believe that a currency 
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tradable sectors add to this demonizing of appreciation.  
These features are to be expected in a democracy and in a country fighting an internal 
war, like Colombia. Nevertheless, the Finance Minister presides over the Board of Directors of 
the Central Bank, and the President had made repeated calls to the Central Bank to keep a 
competitive real exchange rate, casting doubt on the Central Bank’s independence in some 
sectors. This is potentially damaging because inflation expectations might be affected if the 
public perceives a conflict between the inflation targets and the real exchange rate preferences of 
the government. Although the evidence shows that this has not happened thus far (Figure 6), it 
remains a risk factor that must be taken into account. 
 
Monetary Policy and the Domestic Public Bond Market 
 
The outstanding stock of the domestic Treasury bonds (TES) is 23 percent of GDP. The central 
government deficit, which is between 5 and 6 percent of GDP, makes it likely that the TES stock 
will continue rising for years to come. Therefore, changes in TES rates have become a crucial 
issue for the government. If significant intervention in the forex market is sterilized through sales 
of TES in the secondary market, TES rates might be pressured upward. Here the government 
faces a dilemma. On the one hand, it wants the Central Bank to sustain a competitive real 
exchange rate, possibly by intervening in the forex market. On the other hand, it wants to keep 
TES rates at low levels.  
This conflict disappears when monetary policy is relaxed. This is a sign of fiscal 
dominance and represents potential trouble for the credibility of monetary policy. Fortunately, 
the problem is alleviated by the correlation that exists between the exchange rate and the TES 
rates. When sovereign risk premia decrease, there is both an appreciation of the currency and a 
fall in TES rates. This allows the Central Bank to carry out sterilized intervention without 
pushing TES rates too high.  
 
Central Bank Profits 
 
Fiscal problems might lead the government to exert some pressure on the Central Bank to 
generate and transfer large profits every year. However, as long as the Central Bank produces 
positive surpluses, its political position remains strong. An important political economy 
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peso return on reserves is lower that the return on domestic assets. In such an event, the 
government will have to transfer capital resources to the Central Bank in order to restore its net 
worth. This will probably make the Central Bank more vulnerable to pressures coming from the 
government and the Congress.    
 
The Use of International Reserves to Pay the External Debt 
 
In the last quarter of 2003, the government was urged to pass a tax reform to help stabilize public 
finances. Part of the Congress was reluctant to approve the new taxes and asked for the Central 
Bank to contribute to the fiscal adjustment. In fact, the Congress implied that the passage of the 
tax reform could be helped by the use of excesses of international reserves to pay the external 
debt, with the argument that the opportunity cost of reserves was too high. It must be recalled 
that since the second half of 2002 reserves had been sold to support monetary policy in the face 
of a large depreciation. Thus, the Central Bank could not get rid of a significant amount of 
reserves. However, the Central Bank did not want to be blamed for a delay in fiscal adjustment.  
Therefore, it answered that only a small amount of reserves (US$500 million) could be 
used to reduce public external indebtedness. In April 2005, in the face of an increase of 25 
percent in the level of international reserves, the Central Bank decided to sell US$1.25 billion to 
the government to pre-pay an expensive IDB emergency loan, which can be construed as a pre-
emptive move.
8 Some analyst viewed this episode as a surrender of the Central Bank’s 
independence. Although there has been debate on this interpretation, the event illustrates the 
political context in which monetary and exchange rate policies are set in Colombia. 
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
Since September 1999, monetary policy in Colombia has converged to a full-fledged, inflation-
targeting strategy with an independent floating regime. The performance of the strategy has been 
satisfactory overall. Starting from a deep recession, the policy stance has been expansionary. 
Inflation has declined along decreasing targets, output has recovered and international reserves 
have reached levels that limit the external vulnerability of the economy. 
                                                 
8 This transaction allowed the Central Bank to replenish its stock of government securities, enhancing its ability to 
sterilize future interventions.  
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regimes. Intervention in the forex market has been consistent with the shifts in monetary policy. 
As a result, the Central Bank has not used capital controls since 1999.  
The system has resembled managed floating in two episodes characterized by strong 
shifts in the exchange rate. From these episodes, it may be learned that intervention in the forex 
market has been a useful complement of monetary policy actions. That is, relying only on the 
interest rates to deal with shocks to the capital account of the balance of payments may lead to 
inefficient volatility in inflation or output. At the same time, intervention without consistent 
movements in monetary policy has not been effective in affecting the trend of the exchange rate. 
The most convincing hypothesis about the rationale for intervention in Colombia is the 
argument in favor of managed floating. However, a drawback of substantial intervention is the 
difficulty of communicating policy to the public and the market. Another rationale relates to the 
Central Bank’s subsidiary goals, which can be accommodated as long as inflation converges to 
its target. Among these, the Central Bank has mentioned the build-up of international reserves 
and protection of tradable sectors from temporary, sharp appreciations. 
Thus, fiscal imbalances pose a threat to the credibility and power of monetary policy 
through several political economy channels. 
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Table 1. Inflation Targets vs. Inflation Expectations 
 
Target Expectations* Dif. (Exp - Targ)**
%% %
2001 8.0 8.85 0.85
2002 6.0 6.95 0.95
2003 5.0-6.0 6.58 1.08
2004 5.0-6.0 6.13 0.63
2005 4.5-5.5 5.41 0.41
+ According to the Centarl Bank's Quarterly Survey of Inflation Expectations for each January
** Differences correspond to the midpoint of the target range when it applies









1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
STOCK OF GROSS INTERNATIONAL RESERVES (GIR)  (Million 
dollars) 
8.740 8.103 9.006 10.245 10.844 10.921 13.540
M3 / ( GIR )  4,2 4,0 3,1 2,9 2,4 2,7 3,0
  GIR / (Capital payments of current external debt +  Current account deficit ) 0,6 1,0 1,1 1,1 0,9 1,0 1,4
  GIR / (Capital payments of current external debt ) 1,0 0,9 1,0 1,3 1,1 1,1 1,5
Source: Banco de la República. 
Table 2. Indicators of Vulnerability, 1998 - 2004
  
Table 3. Exchange Rate Volatility and Coefficient of Variation, 2000-2004 
 
Colombia Mexico Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Brazil Chile
2000 1,9% 1,3% 2,0% 1,5% 2000 45,7% 84,0% 62,1% 62,5%
2001 1,1% 1,3% 3,9% 2,4% 2001 79,2% 81,8% 67,8% 74,8%
2002 2,5% 1,0% 5,6% 2,1% 2002 76,9% 113,1% 69,4% 59,0%
2003 1,5% 1,9% 3,4% 2,3% 2003 67,8% 67,6% 74,7% 61,9%
2004 1,6% 1,1% 2,1% 2,5% 2004 45,5% 77,9% 82,7% 58,2%
1Average of the monthly variation of the exchange rate.
2 Coefficient of variation of the monthly exchange rate changes
For references about this index see Levy-Yeyati, Eduardo and
Sturzenegger, Federico, "Classifying Exchange Rate Regimes:
Deeds vs. Words" . European Economic Review, Forthcoming 
Exchange rate volatility









Colombia Mexico Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Brazil Chile
2000 2,1% 6,3% 28,6% 6,3% 2000 3,4% 29,2% 8,5% 3,5%
2001 4,6% 9,9% 22,9% 6,9% 2001 3,2% 39,0% 7,9% 2,3%
2002 2,3% 6,0% 23,5% 10,9% 2002 2,0% 15,9% 19,4% 3,6%
2003 3,5% 7,5% 10,5% 9,1% 2003 2,0% 5,7% 20,4% 2,0%
2004 2,9% 8,0% 11,0% 8,3% 2004 4,9% 6,9% 6,8% 2,9%
4 Average of monthly change in r, where r is defined as
5 Coefficient of variation of international reserves
R represents the International Assets and B is the Monetary base in US dollars.
CV of international reserves
5 Monthly Intervention in the Foreign Market
4
For references about this index see Levy-Yeyati, Eduardo and Sturzenegger, Federico,
























 Table 5. 
 
I T II T III T IV T 2003 I T II T III T IV T 2004
..
Direct Investment Net (FDI) 276 494 579 -493 855 536 713 698 650 2.597
Foreign Direct Investment in Colombia 325 529 588 352 1.793 585 735 725 694 2.739
Direct Investment Abroad -49 -35 -9 -845 -938 -49 -22 -27 -44 -142
Total Public Sector 102 -33 301 64 435 33 -245 -280 625 136
Financial Public Sector -136 -113 50 -88 -287 -123 -113 -55 -127 -419
Non - Financial Public Sector 239 80 251 152 722 157 -131 -225 753 555
Long-term 617 52 395 393 1.457 -195 180 295 633 912
Disbursement 1.352 1.249 1.173 1.141 4.915 643 500 637 1.110 2.890
Amortization 735 1.197 778 748 3.459 838 320 342 477 1.977
Short-term -379 28 -143 -240 -734 351 -311 -520 120 -358
Total Private Sector without FDI* 61 -560 -548 553 -495 398 -14 -44 473 813
Non - Financial Private Sector 210 -310 -464 510 -54 375 -64 -376 342 277
Leasing 123 -55 -381 -5 -319 -50 -69 -19 16 -122
Long-term -363 -156 -259 53 -726 -115 -335 -489 -557 -1.496
Disbursement 134 303 222 729 1.387 434 208 245 416 1.303
Amortization 497 458 481 676 2.112 549 543 734 973 2.799
Short-term 450 -99 176 462 990 540 340 131 884 1.895
Portfolio (Assets) 3 -351 -386 -400 -1.135 -67 -327 -210 116 -488
Loans and others 447 252 562 862 2.125 608 667 341 767 2.383
Financial Private Sector -149 -251 -84 43 -441 24 50 331 131 536
Long-term -76 9 -10 27 -51 36 -16 -23 -12 -15
Short-term -72 -259 -74 15 -390 -12 66 355 142 551
Other Financial Flows -2 0 -24 -4 -30 0 -5 -44 -2 -51
* Includes External indebtedness and net foreign assets.
Source: Banco de la República.
Balance of Payments
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Figure 2. Real 90-day Interest Rate
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     CPI Inflation          Core* Inflation          Inflation
* Core Inflation: refers to inflation excluding
fd t f f  
 
 
(*) Calculated from the differential of rates of TES UVR and fixed-rates TES (for
contracts of under two years)
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PPI Imported Goods Depreciation
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*Core Inflation refers to CPI without 
Source  : Banco de la República, DANE
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Figure 17. Annual Variation in the Average Exchange Rate Versus Annual Variation in International Reserves
in Selected Countries,  2003 -2004
REVALUATION AND GROWTH OF
INTERNATIONAL RESERVES
DEVALUATION AND GROWTH OF
INTERNATIONAL RESERVES
REVALUATION AND DECREASE OF
INTERNATIONAL RESERVES
DEVALUATION AND DECREASE OF
INTERNATIONAL RESERVES
Source: Compiled information of the Central Banks Web Sites.
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* Consumer Price Index excluding foodstuffs, public utilities and educational services. 
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